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Surely an aim of  science is the discovery of  the truth. Truth may not be the 
sole aim, as Popper and others have so clearly pointed out, but surely it is an 
aim of our hypothesizing. 
Now, clearly, questions of  rationality of  method are questions about the 
suitability of  means toward accomplishing the ends toward which they are 
directed. A method is rational if it is suitable (or at least as suitable as any 
other method, or something like that) for accomplishing the ends to which it 
is put. 
So, if our ends include the truth, surely a method would be rational only if 
it guaranteed that the theories we accepted were true. Such, of  course, is the 
criterion of  rationality of  rationalism. 
But most of  us aren't rationalists. Why not? Because we are convinced that 
were we to restrict our beliefs to those of  whose truth we could be certain, 
our class of  believed hypotheses would be very small indeed; indeed, most of  
us would say, null. 
Now we could accept the consequences of  this in the skeptical way. We 
could, that is, take certainty o f  truth as requisite for rationality and agree that 
we have few rational beliefs indeed, and that the bulk of  what we had be- 
lieved all along simply was not rational belief on our part. But most o f  us will 
not go this route. Rather we will lower our standards of  rationality. 
Instead of  demanding that what we believe be certain in order that our 
belief be rational, we might, for example, move in the direction of  taking 
ourselves to be rational if what we believe is certified by our methods to be 
merely probably true, or likely to be true, or if our methods lead us to beliefs 
which we may take, in Goldstick's terms as 'apt to be true'. 1 
But we must be careful here. For 'probable truth'  or 'likely truth'  are not, 
of  course, kinds of  truth. Indeed, the connection between being 'probably 
true and being true, simpliciter, is a hard one to fathom. 
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Things would be simpler if we relied only on the a priori truth of  hypothe- 
ses. But we do not. Rather we are concerned with the probability of  hypothe- 
ses relative to our evidence base. Two theorizers with differing evidential 
bases may quite rightly assign differing probabilities to hypotheses. But, of  
course, truth, as opposed to probable truth, just doesn't work that way at all. 
Indeed, on reflection it becomes difficult to see what we mean by 'proba- 
bly true' or 'likely to be true' or 'apt to be true' at all, unless we mean by it 
'worthy of  reasonable belief on the evidence'. And if that is the best analysis 
we can provide, then what insight have we obtained when we aver that one 
should rationally believe only those hypotheses which are 'apt to be true' or 
are 'probably true'? 
II 
And yet we do sometimes feel that we can distinguish the aim of  obtaining 
true hypotheses from those other aims which characterize our scientific en- 
deavor (simplicity o f  befiefs? stability of  belief? communicability and 
lea.rnability of  theories?). And, perhaps, we can distinguish those elements in 
our canon of  rationality which are there because they are 'marks of  truth'  of  
hypotheses from those which are there for other reasons. Let us suppose we 
can do this. And let us suppose that we can assimilate the former elements 
into a single probability function which assigns to a hypothesis a real number 
from zero to one relative to a body of  evidence. Under these circumstances is 
it really the case that a principle like methodological conservatism must be 
immediately ruled out of  court? 
Here is an argument that might, initially, make one think so: Hypotheses 
have probabilities relative to the evidence. Surely we should not believe a 
hypothesis unless its probability is greater than one-half; that is, unless it is 
'more likely to be true than not ' .  But one couldn't have two incompatible 
hypotheses both with probabilities greater than one-half. So either there is 
only one o f  a set of  mutually incompatible hypotheses worthy of  belief or 
none are. In any case there is never more than one worthy of  belief. So a rule 
of  conservatism, or any other rule designed to select between hypotheses other- 
wise equally worthy of  belief, is never an element of  a canon of  rational belief. 
But, even assuming that we can assign probabilities to hypotheses relative 
to the evidence, do we ever have the probability of  a scientific theory greater 
than one-half? Many have thought not. Consider the problem of getting 
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universal generalizations (a crucial component of scientific hypotheses) to 
have a probability greater than zero in a world of  (apparently) infinite indivi- 
duals and unlimited variety. Consider the inductive evidence as to the falsity 
of our previously preciously and confidently held beliefs. Consider the pro- 
blem of 'metaphysical' alternatives which are apparently incompatible and 
yet mutually compatible with all possible evidential data. And, finally, and 
perhaps most importantly, consider in any given decision which involves 
choosing a hypothesis to believe, the infinite wealth of alternative hypothe- 
ses, which would explain the data to date as well as any we at present have 
thought up, but which haven't yet even been imagined by the scientific 
community. 
Now we could adopt a 'limited rationalism' which insists that some realistic 
scientific hypotheses just are more probable than not on the basis of the 
evidence. Or we could opt for a skepticism which tells us that hypotheses just 
never are worthy of belief. Or we could, again, lower our standards. We could 
maintain that even when the probability of  a hypothesis is less than one-half 
there may still be good reason to believe it. 
But if we adopt this last stance we may be faced with incompatible hypo- 
theses of equally high probability, one of which we deem more worthy of 
belief than the other. We deem this to be the case on grounds other than a 
differential possession of the 'marks of truth' of  the hypotheses, of course. We 
might do so on the grounds that while truth is an aim of science it isn't the 
only aim. The other aims give us different rules, rules for choice over and 
above those based on the possession of 'probability' by the hypothesis. A rule 
of simplicity might be such a canon for belief. Or, we might do so on purely 
methodological grounds. We might, for example, deem it appropriate to be as 
stable in our beliefs as we can be without doing injustice to new hypotheses 
on other grounds. That is, we might be methodological conservatives. 
But can we really be said to rationally believe hypotheses of  which we 
cannot affirm that it is 'more likely than not that they are true'? And which 
we choose merely because they are simple? Or because they were earlier 
chosen and we don't want to give them up without good reason? There are a 
number of options we could take here. 
We might try to retrench in the hypotheses we consider. If  none of the 
ones we have been considering is 'more probable than not '  perhaps there are 
other, weaker, ones which are 'more probable than not'.  If  I am far from 
certain, for example, that general relativity is correct, am I not at least nearly 
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certain that some theory which allows for a range of  consequences centered 
around the predictions of  general relativity is correct? And isn't it this latter, 
weaker, theory the one I should believe? But am I ever nearly certain that 
even such weakened theories are correct? 
Another thing we could do is to say that we accept scientific hypotheses, 
but we don' t  believe them. We 'tentatively take them as best to date' but we 
don't  really believe them to say what is the case. But can we really draw this 
distinction in such a way that any role whatever is left for 'genuine belief' as 
opposed to 'mere acceptance'? Or has belief then become something we are 
never justified in having, and, hence, a mere detached and inoperative part of  
our conceptual machinery? Aren't we just trying to have our skeptical cake 
and eat it too? 
Finally we could just lower our standards for belief, allowing that we do 
and should, believe hypotheses on grounds which we can't appropriately 
identity with those which may properly be called 'marks of  truth'.  Is such a 
position patently absurd? 
Of course such a position has its own difficulties which will need to be 
met. The earlier requirement of  high probability had the danger that we might 
always be led by our criteria to withhold belief. The new more permissive 
rules, if they are not suitably constrained, might lead us never to withhold 
belief. But there are, of  course, times when none of  the available hypotheses 
seems suitable to us. 
III 
Goldstick offers a moral analogy to convince us of  the irrationality of  conser- 
vatism. Suppose two actors act differently and incompatibly, all morally 
relevant features of  their situation being the same. Suppose someone now 
deems each to have acted justifiably - and judges that they each would have 
been unjustified had they acted otherwise - on the basis that the first did 
what he did and the second did what he did. Goldstick appeals to the reader's 
intuition that such a method of  evaluation is "excluded by the very concept 
of  what it is to be justified". 
Perhaps so. But is the analogy fair to conservatism? Or is this analogy 
more like it: For whatever reasons two actors have, all along, been acting in 
different, incompatible ways. Nothing in their situation distinguishes them in 
a morally relevant way. Someone now deems it morally right for each to 
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continue to act as he always has, on the basis of  the reasoning that there is 
nothing in either's moral environment which militates a change, and under 
those circumstances continuing to do what you have been doing seems the 
best course. Does that offend moral intuition? And isn't conservatism a 
doctrine about continuing to do what you have been doing (continuing to 
hold a belief already in your  corpus of  beliefs) and not a thesis about ini- 
tiating some new action (adding a new belief to your corpus of  beliefs)? 
Conservatism is not 'permissivism', and it is toward a (not plausible) version 
of  the latter that Goldstick's analogy is directed. 
Goldstick describes the paper he is replying to as a defense of  conserva- 
tism. It isn't really. It explores one kind of  conservatism. It finds it not  
logically absurd. But it doesn't find it very important. It briefly mentions 
another doctrine which might be called conservative, but finds the doctrine 
obscure. Now the one kind of  conservatism, the kind Goldstick was discussing 
in his original paper and the kind first discussed in the paper to which he is 
replying in this journal, may be absurd. It may conflict with some intuitions 
so strongly nothing we could say in its defense would help make it more 
plausible. "Surely", some will say, "a ground for belief which is not a ground 
for taking something to be true is no ground for belief at all". And they may 
claim that this is, if not  a purely logical truth, at least an 'analytical' truth 
given the meaning of  'belief'. 
But we do talk about scientists believing hypotheses. And a description of  
how they do behave, even the best of  them, may show us that they are fixing 
their beliefs by means o f  rules like conservatism (or simplicity, or probability 
resting upon purely subjective a priori probability assignments) which, on 
inspection, seem to have no warrant in terms of  'aptness toward truth'.  We 
could say that they don' t  really believe any hypotheses at all. Or we could say 
that they are irrational. But is it clear that we shouldn't say that the criteria 
of  rationality in belief may outrun those which 'aim at the truth'  in the 
narrow sense? 
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i See Daniel Goldstick, 'More on Methodological Conservatism', Philosophical Studies, 
this issue, pp. 193-195. 
